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Abstract
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Events have impact 
on lodging industry finance 
by A. J. Singh 
Eyrevieb%hgevenk in the last quarter of the 
2Mh century that have impacted the amounl 
and fype of lodging industry financing, the 
author analyzes these historical trends and 
major events to alert lodging industry 
investors, lenders, legislators, and hotel 
operators when simikr events emerge in 
the future. 
A s the lodging industry moves into the 21st century, it faces many uncertainties. 
These uncertainties are based on 
the underlying premise that the 
lodging industry is dependent upon 
financing for its growth and devel- 
opment. Various recent studies 
have tried to alleviate these uncer- 
tainties by predicting the extent 
and nature of capital availability to 
the lodging industry in the future.' 
The last three decades of the 
20th century (1970-1999) have 
witnessed three capital market 
cycles; the peaks represented 
capital availability to the lodging 
industry and the troughs signiiied 
periods when lenders and investors 
- -- 
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stopped supplying capital to the 
industry. At the end of each cycle the 
lodging industry emerged a little 
different from the previous decade. 
The purpose of this study was 
to identfi the critical events that 
iduenced availability of capital to 
the U. S. lodging industry in this 
period and to discuss the structural 
changes to the lodging industry and 
lodging industry finance in each 
progressive decade. The study is 
historical research and relies upon 
secondary literature. Commenting 
on historical research, Baum- 
gartner stated, Wsing the histor- 
ical approach, the researcher 
endeavors to record and under- 
stand events of the past. In turn, 
interpretations of recorded history 
hold to provide better under- 
standing of the present and suggest 
possible future directions." ' 
The relationship between 
capital availability and room starts 
has been well documented. Figure 1 
illustrates the close relationship 
between the availability of capital 
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and room starts (one measure of 
lodging industry growth). For 
example, convenient access to 
capital through the mortgage REI% 
of the early 1970s pushed room 
starts in 1973 to 155,400. 
Conversely, in the early 1990s, as 
capital availability tightened, room 
starts declined. As capital avail- 
ability increased in the second half 
of the 1990s, room starts also 
picked up. 
Events have impact 
Over the past 30 years, many 
interrelated events have had an 
impact on the availability of capital 
to the lodging industry. Each event 
culminated in a critical event that 
directly impacted the increase or 
decrease of debt and equity capital 
to the lodging industry. A review of 
these critical events and their 
impact on the lodging industry is 
discussed in the context of the 
three decades. 
1970s are boom time 
Critical event 1-REITs: 
During the late 1960s, as investors 
were not able to achieve adequate 
returns from stocks, they looked to 
real estate as a hedge against infla- 
tion. An efficient means of investing 
in real estate that developed during 
this period is known as the real 
estate investment trust (REIT). The 
REITs that financed the real estate 
boom of the early 1970s were mort- 
gage REITs, as opposed to the 
equity REITs of the 1990s. 
Mortgage REITs were essen- 
tially lenders, and in the early 1970s 
they were responsible for providing 
first and second mortgages, 
construction and development 
loans, and joint venture loans for 
hotel development. These REITs 
raised capital by selling shares to 
the public, issuing commercial 
paper, and borrowing from banks. 
It is estimated that between 1969 
and 1972 the REPT industry sold 
Figure 1 
U.S. lodging industry room starts compared 
to availability of capital (1967-1999) 
I I 
Source: PficewateiiIouse Coopers, The WEFA Group. Adapted from Global Lodging 
Almanac by Bear Stearns (m). 
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securities worth $1 billion to $2 
billion each year." 
An advantage of these lending 
institutions over traditional 
lenders was that they were rela- 
tively unregulated. As the spread 
of rates a t  which they made their 
loans and their own cost of capital 
increased, their share prices 
showed dramatic increases in the 
early 1970s. The national stagfla- 
tion (caused by simultaneous 
increase of both price level and 
unemployment rate) of 1974 
destroyed the mortgage REITs 
because, as their cost of borrowing 
increased, they were unable to get 
adequate returns on their loans 
and, as the REITs became nnprof- 
itable, they were unable to attract 
investors to buy their shares. This 
problem was further exacerbated 
by the highly leveraged nature of 
the mortgage REITE; in some cases 
their debt-to-equity ratio was as 
high as 4:1."rom a peak of 200 
REITs in 1974, their number was 
reduced to less than 100 by the end 
of the decade." 
In the early 19706, mortgage 
REITs (and other lenders) kept 
developers supplied with capital 
for development. As a result, the 
supply of rooms showed a large 
increase during this period. In 
competition with these REITs, 
commercial banks, savings-and- 
loan associations, and other 
lending institutions made loans 
that exceeded prudent levels. 
A study by Laventhol & 
Honvath, a premier lodging 
industry consulting firm, during 
this period summarizes the effects 
-- 
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of overbuilding when the environ- 
ment changed:" 
During 1973-1974, overbuilding 
in  the hospitality field was 
aggravated by several unex- 
pected factors. First, the 
energy crisis reduced travel. 
Second, developers were hit 
with staggering construction 
cost increases and cost over- 
runs. Third, interest rates went 
up. With soaring costs crimping 
their profits, many developers 
had decided to wait for the 
widely-predicted lowering of 
long-term interest rates. 
Accordingly, many projects 
were undertaken without long- 
term mortgage commitments, 
and certain lenders flush with 
cash-notably REITs-did not 
discourage the practice. The 
Federal Reserve Board, 
however, in a n  attempt to 
dampen the country's rampant 
inflation, began to tighten the 
money supply and interest rates 
reacted appropriately (went 
up), catching builders with 
high-cost long-term financing, 
or-worsenone a t  all. Fourth, 
as the recession started to take 
hold, consumer confidence 
began to wither and demand 
for real estate projects of all 
sorts evaporated. 
Because of this hostile envi- 
ronment, lenders became owners 
of non-performing lodging proper- 
ties. Loan write-offs continued to 
increase. REITs started to fail due 
to their over-leveraged position. 
Besides REITs. other lenders also 
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suffered losses on commercial real 
estate and hotel loans. 
1980s show change 
Critical events 2, 3-Deregu- 
lation: Until the early 1980s, 
savings-and-loan institutions or 
S&Ls primarily financed housing 
through traditional mortgages at 
fixed interest rates for the duration 
of the loan. These long-term loans 
(30 years) were primarily funded by 
short-term deposits. Moreover, 
regulations at this time (based on 
Regulation Q: A regulation of the 
Federal Reserve for depository 
institutions) imposed interest-rate 
ceilings on these deposits. Under 
conditions of stable interest rates 
this is not a problem, but if interest 
rates rise above the interest rate on 
the mortgage loans, a negative 
spread results for the institution. 
This is what happened from 1979 to 
1982 when the Federal Reserve 
radically changed its monetary 
policy by targeting bank reserves 
rather than interest rates in an 
attempt to lower the rate of infla- 
tion.' Due to this restrictive mone- 
tary policy, there was a surge in 
interest rates, with rates on T-bills 
rising to as high as 16 percent. 
This increase in short-term 
rates and the cost of funds had two 
effects on S&Ls. First, as they were 
saddled with fixed-rate, long-term 
home mortgages, their earnings 
spread became negative, as their 
cost of funds was higher than what 
they were receiving from the 
interest on home mortgages. 
Second, due to Regulation Q, which 
restricted the interest rate they 
could pay on deposits, they were at 
a competitive disadvantage from 
the newly emerging money-market 
mutual funds, which paid a much 
higher market rate. The result of 
this was disintermediation or Loss 
of depositors and hence erosion of 
their capital base. 
In an attempt to counter this 
problem, Congress set into motion 
the deregulation of depository insti- 
tutions by passing the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA, 
1980) and Garn-St. Germain Act of 
1982. These two acts expanded the 
deposit-taking and asset-invest- 
ment powers of S&Ls. They were 
now able to offer deposits at higher 
rates of interest and make 
consumer and commercial loans 
through adjustable-rate mortgages. 
For many institutions, deregu- 
lation made them safer and more 
diversified. However, for a signifi- 
cant number of S&Ls, whose earn- 
ings and shareholder capital were 
being depleted in traditional l i e s  
of business, it meant the opportu- 
nity to take more risks in an 
attempt to return to profitability. As 
a result, many S&Ls made high- 
risk loans-acquisition and devel- 
opment loans and construction 
loans on "location-oriented busi- 
nesses" such as hotels, resorts, golf 
courses, and fast-food restaurants? 
At first the deregulated climate 
improved the profitability of the 
industry. However, in 1984, a 
regional economic crisis began to 
unfold in Texas as crude oil prices 
began to fall, which caused enor- 
mous declines in real estate values. 
14 FIU Hospitality Review 
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This crisis spread to other parts of 
the nation. National delinquency 
rates on mortgages increased from 
2.1 percent in 1983 to 5 percent in 
1986.' Hindsight has shown that 
thls loss of asset quality by the 
S&Ls was caused by the regulatory 
environment, which permitted 
them access to new areas in which 
they had no experience. The FSLIC 
(the insurer of S&Ls) accentuated 
this risk-taking behavior because it 
did not peg its insurance premium 
to the risk profile of the S&L, nor did 
it close down capilal-depleted insti- 
tutions. 
Abundant capltal from S&Ls, 
along with favorable accounting 
rules (allowing shorter deprecia- 
tion periods) and tax incentives to 
invest in commercial real estate 
provided by ERTA (the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 19811, resulted 
in a massive hotel construction 
boom. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
(TRA) took away the previous bene- 
fits accorded by ERTA. As Arnold 
(1994) states: 
The passage of TRA had an 
instantaneous and devastating 
effect on the real estate industry. 
Construction for many types of 
real estate (including hotels) 
virtually halted. Default rates 
increased to record levels. In 
many cases, it became apparent 
that many thrift institutions, 
lacking experience in making 
real estate and construction 
loans, had accumulated portfo- 
lios with such a large percentage 
of bad loans that default was 
inevitable. 
To rectify the s~tuation, 
Congress passed the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act (FIRREA) in 1989. 
The two main tasks of this act were 
to once again regulate S&Ls (by 
establishing strict capital stan- 
dards) and to establish the Resolu- 
tion Trust Corporation (RTC), 
which was designed to take over 
failed S&Ls and dispose of their 
assets. 
Critical event 44helters: 
Prior to the passage of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, real estate 
limited partnerships were a 
popular way to raise capital. This 
was done through the 
process of syndication. In a syndi- 
cate, a group of investors pool their 
capital for investment in real 
estate.'O Two primary types of 
syndicate structures were 
commonly used: a single-class 
syndicate, in which each investor 
receives a pro rata ownership 
interest in the syndicate for a one- 
time investment in cash, and a 
multi-class syndicate, in which 
investors awn different classes of 
shares. 
Prior to the passage of TRA, 
syndicate structures were set up 
mainly as a tax-sheltered way to 
invest in hotel real estate. The 
reversal of the tax advantages as a 
result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
resulted in an increase in deprecia- 
tion schedules from 18 years to 31.5 
years, investment tax credit was 
repealed and passive investment 
losses could no longer shield earned 
income." Hotel projects, which were 
initiated prior to the passage of the 
TRA, were conceived as tax-shel- 
Singh 
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tered vehicles. As such the reversal 
resulted in an excess inventory of 
unprofitable hotels as the 1980s 
came to a close. 
The 1990s are overbuilt 
Critical event 5-Excess: 
Excess room inventory, the 
declining value of hotel real estate, 
the inability of hotels to meet debt 
service, the S&L debacle, and a 
national recession all combined to 
shut off funding for hotel projects in 
the early 1990s. In particular, tradi- 
tional lenders such as commercial 
banks, life insurance companies, 
and S&Ls stopped lending on hotel 
projects. A survey of lenders in 1990 
by Hospitality Valuation Services'" 
indicated that only 33 percent of 
lenders would consider new hotel 
loans. The remaining lenders 
stated that new hotel loans were too 
risky. These lenders did not plan to 
return to hotel lending in the near 
future. This was a period when 
lenders were more concerned with 
disposing off the non-performing 
hotels that they were forced to 
acquire, or working with hotel 
owners to restructure their loans. 
The investment climate during 
the early 1990s is reflected in an 
investment survey conducted by 
PKF Consulting during this 
period.'" (See Table 1.) The survey 
indicates the increased risk of a 
hotel investment, which is reflected 
in higher interest rates, capitaliza- 
tion rates, debt coverage ratios, 
loan-to-value ratios, return require- 
ments, and other investment and 
lending criteria. It should be noted 
that although by 1992 interest 
rates had come down, hotel loans 
were still difficult to obtain. Since 
capital was difficult to obtain, 
investors had to use more of their 
own equity to secure loans, which 
lowered loan-to-value ratios. 
The true nature of the real 
estate "credit crunch" during 
1992-1993 is summed up in a 
research newsletter by Grubb & 
Ellis, a real estate advisory firm: 
"The truth seems to be that the 
crisis in real estate finance, where 
it exists, is not a crisis born of a 
shortage of loan funds. Instead it is 
one of confidence, on the part of 
both lenders and buyers, in the 
integrity of investment real estate 
in a severely overbuilt market."" 
Critical event 6-Alterna- 
tives: From 1990 to 1993, when 
traditional hotel financing sources 
curtailed their lending in the over- 
built commercial real estate 
market, alternative sources of 
financing emerged to partially fill in 
the gap and also take advantage of 
the depressed values of hotel real 
estate. Finance companies, 
charging very high rates of interest, 
were the main providers of capital. 
These companies were called 
'lenders of last resort" primarily 
because of their high financing 
costs. They were appropriate when 
funds needed were for existing prop- 
erties with appreciation potential. 
A review of the Crittenden 
Report on Real Estate Financing 
from 1990-1993 revealed some of 
the early finance companies 
involved with hotel lending were 
G.E. Capital, Heller Financial, 
Security Pacific, Barclays American 
FZU Hospitality Review 
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Table 1 
Investment criteria 
(1 986-1 992) 
1986 1988 1990 1992 
. . .  . .  Overall cap rate . . . . . . . .  .10.90% . .  .11.10% .10.20% .11.90% 
. . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . .  Discount rate (IRR) .13.80% .14.60% .15.0% .16.0% 
. . . . . .  . . . . .  Holding period (yrs) . . . . . .  .9.3 . . . . . .  .8.8 .9.6 2 . 4  
. . . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . .  Debt coverage ratio .1.30 .1.30 .1.30 .1.60 
. . . .  . . .  Income growth rate . . . . . .  .4.00% . . . .  .4.40% .4.80% .3.80% 
. . . .  . . .  Expense growth rate . . . . . .  .4.30% . . . .  .4.30% .4.70% .3.60% 
. . . .  . . . .  Interest rate . . . . . . . . . . .  .10.18 . . . .  .11.6% .11.5% .8.9% 
. . . .  . . .  . . . . . . . . . .  . . . .  Loan to value .72.5% .73.6% .69.0% .67.4% 
Source: PKF Consulting 
-- 
and Money Store, PMC Capital, I'IT Opportunity funds defined 
Small Business Finance and West- Opportunity funds are still 
inghou~e.'~ Some of these compa- loosely defined in the hotel real 
nies, specifically the Money Store, estate industry. However, Richard 
PMC capital and Small Busi- G. Carlson, of DeloiLte & Touche, a 
ness Finance, worked closely with consulting firm, defines them as "a 
the Small BusinessAdmmstration source of capital that has a 
as providers of SBA guaranteed contrarian investment focus on 
commercial mortgages. While under-performing properties and 
foreign commercial banks were loans."" Investment banks are the 
more willing than domestic banks source of most of these funds, but in 
to provide financing to the hotel some cases the source of these 
industry, even they were beginning funds may be a company with an 
to reduce their exposure to the opportunistic focus. These entities 
industry.I6 acquire under-performing hotel 
However, three new sources 01 properties or other forms of real 
financing emerged during this estate and loans, with the purpose 
period: of turning around the investments 
opportunity funds through repositioning, restruc- 
evolution of the secondary 
mortgage market, the securiti- 
zation of commercial realestate, 
including hotels, and the 
creation of new hancing struc- 
tures (CMBSs, CMOS, and 
P W \ b T P e l  
turing, or updating, and then 
waiting for the market to improve. 
The long-term objective of these 
funds is to buy properties a t  rock 
bottom prices or at times when 
capital is scarce, hold the invest- 
ments for a few years, and then sell 
' L U I . L I U 0 ,  
them at much higher urioes. thus 
- 
equity real estate investment reaping huge profits on the assets. 
trusts (equity REITs) Many opportunity funds 
Singh 
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started in 1990 when the Resolu- 
tion Trust Corporation was 
disposing of the real estate assets of 
failed S&Ls. The majority of their 
early acquisitions occurred during 
the period from 1990-1992, gener- 
ally considered to be the bottom of 
the real estate cycle. Investors in 
these funds may include institu- 
tions, such as pension funds, or 
high-net-worth individuals. The 
high yields (20 to 25 percent) and 
the passive nature of the invest- 
ment were the primary motivations 
for investors in these funds. Some 
examples of opportunistic investing 
that went directly to the hotel 
industry can be seen in Table 2. 
Generally speaking, opportu- 
nity funds are not currently very 
active as a funding source in the 
hotel industry. Those that still exist 
have been transformed into some 
form of acquisition fund, because as 
the prices of hotel real estate 
continue to rise, the opportunities 
to purchase at deep discounts have 
been reduced. 
Markets are broadened 
Amajor change in the way that 
commercial real estate in general 
and hotel real estate in particular 
is being currently financed is the 
linkage of the originators of mort- 
gage loans with the broader capital 
markets. Colloquially this is also 
referred to the linkage of "Main 
Table 2 
Opportunistic investments in the hotel industry 
Year Investor Acquisition Value 
1992 Ashford Financial 143 hotels frum RTC $380 million 
and Fisher Family (57 percent discount) 
1993 Colony Capital, Hilton Hyatt Regency Waikoloa $55 million 
Hotels and Pan Global (1,241 room resort) (85 percent discount) 
1993 KSL Recreation La Quinta Resort and $276.4 million 
(Created by Kohlberg, PGA West (57 percent discount) 
Kravis and Roberts, the 
LBO firm) 
1993 Morgan Stanley Real Cannel Valley Resort and NIA 
Estate Fund Dora1 Telluride Resort & 
Spa. Red Roof Inns 
1994 Asbford Financial, 14 Howard Johnsons and NIA 
Fisher Family and three full-service hotels 
George Soros 
1994 Interstone Partners 3 M-service hotels NIA 
(JV between Interstate 
Hotels and Blackstone 
Gmup) 
1994 Stanvood Capital Interests in 8000 rooms NIA 
Source Rob& G. H a r p  
FIU Hospitality Review 
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Street with Wall Street." This 
linkage started with the develop- 
ment of a secondary market for real 
estate. Until the 1970s, when a 
bank or another financial institu- 
tion originated a loan, it was held 
on its balance sheet until the loan 
was paid off. The secondary market 
in real estate began when lenders 
in a particular geographical area, 
who had more available capital 
than demand for it, bought mort- 
gages from lenders in geographical 
areas that had a shortage of capital. 
This secondary market received 
further impetus when the RTC in 
the early 1990s acquired failed 
S&Ls and banks and sold off non- 
performing mortgages. 
"Securitization" is a process by 
which an asset, such as a mort- 
gage, is standardized into indi- 
vidual units, such as shares. An 
investor in these shares is a partial 
owner of a large pool of mortgages. 
The direct-sale program started to 
revolutionize mortgage lending by 
letting the mortgage originator 
remove mortgages off its books and 
sell them to another party. 
However, the creation of securities 
carried the revolution to greater 
heights by converting the mort- 
gage instrument into a packaged 
product, which could then be sold 
in an organized market just like a 
stock or bond. 
The securitization of real 
estate is part of the new advances 
in finance called "financial engi- 
neering," which John Finnerty 
says "involves the design, the 
development, and the implementa- 
tion of innovative financial instru- 
ments and processes, and the 
formulation of creative solutions to 
problems in finance."" 
The key words in the definition 
include creative and innovative. 
This type of creativity was first 
seen in the creation of products 
such as the swap, zero coupons 
bonds, junk bonds, and-in the 
case of the securitization of real 
estak+the first mortgage-backed 
securities. Starting with the first 
plain vanilla CMBS or commercial 
mortgage-backed securities, these 
instruments evolved into more 
sophisticated forms such as CMOs 
or Collateralized Mortgage Obliga- 
tions, and REMICs or Real Estate 
Mortgage Investment Conduits. 
While similar in concept, each of 
these securities was designed to 
suit different investors and struc- 
tured to improve tax efficiency. 
RElTs re-emerge 
The securitization of real estate 
was one of the solutions to the 
problem of scarcity of capital for 
commercial real estate, in general, 
and hotels, in particular, during the 
early 1990s. Selling debt securities 
(CMBSs and CMOs) to the broader 
public market increased the flow of 
capital to the lodging industry. On 
the equity side, another solution to 
the scarcity of capital during this 
period was offered by the reemer- 
gence of real estate investment 
trusts (REITs). 
The equity REITs of the 1990s 
were different fmm the mortgage 
REITs of the 1970s, however. While 
both mortgage REITs and equity 
REITs sold shares to individuals 
Singh 
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and institutions, the former were 
akin to banks because they used the 
funds to make loans, while equity 
REITs are akin to corporations 
because they are investment vehi- 
cles that use the funds to acquire or 
construct hotels. 
The New York Institute of 
Finance (1988) states: 
A REIT may be a corporation, 
business trust, or association 
primarily developed to own or 
finance real estate. As with 
most corporations, a board of 
directors or trustees elected by 
shareholders sets policy and 
arranges the day-to-day opera- 
tion of the REIT by professional 
managers or advisors. Persons 
with real estate experience, 
such as real estate brokers or 
mortgage bankers, organize 
many REITS. They may also be 
organized by commercial hanks 
or insurance companies."" 
Once legally organized, an 
equity REIT begins its existence by 
issuing shares of stocks. To 
purchase properties, equity REPm 
sell securities to institutional 
investors, issue commercial paper, 
and borrow from banks. Traditional 
equity REIT investments include 
the purchase of office buildings, 
apartments, shopping centers, 
warehouses, and hotels. REIT 
shares trade on the major stock 
exchanges. This provides liquidity 
to the holders of REIT shares. 
Besides being a type of mutual 
fund for purchasing real estate 
and being organized like a corpo- 
ration, REITS are also intended to 
be a tax "conduit" or pass-through, 
according to section 856-60 of the 
Internal Revenue Code. This 
means that REITs are exempt from 
wrporate income tax as long as 
they distribute 95 percent of their 
income to their stockholders. 
REITs as they are known today 
emerged in the early 1990s. Kimco 
Realty, a regional-mall REIT, was 
the pioneer in the field with its 
public offering in November 1991. 
In fact, the asset class that led the 
cmergence of equity REITs was 
regional malls. As the operating 
performance of hotels improved, 
they became the next target for 
REITS." 
RFS Hotel Investors was the 
first of the modern hotel industry 
REITs, with its initial public 
off'ering in August 1993. Jameson 
Inns, Equity Inns, Winston Hotels, 
Felcor Suites, and Innkeepers USA 
followed in 1994, and Stanvood 
Lodging Trust in 1995. Arnold 
states that the resurgence of equity 
REITs in the 1990s can be traced to 
three primary  motivation^:^^ 
As the traditional financing 
sources such as banks, S&Ls, and 
insurance companies stopped 
funding commercial real estate 
(including hotels), a vacuum was 
created. As a result, real estate 
developers, managers, and owners 
saw REITS as a means to raise 
capital and finance growth. 
The demand for REITS also 
came from institutional investors 
such as mutual funds and pension 
funds. These investors wanted to 
continue investing in real estate 
but needed an exit strategy. Securi- 
tization and investment in REIT 
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shares provided the ideal solution. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
took away the tax shelter advan- 
tages of investing in commercial 
real estate, including hotels. At the 
same time, the tax shelter partner- 
ships and syndicates that were 
formed prior to the passage of the 
act were no longer the ideal busi- 
ness format for investing in real 
estate. Furthermore, there was an 
excess inventory of real estate, 
resulting in unprofitable operations 
and the eventual decline in the 
value of real estate, including 
hotels, by the early 1990s. During 
this period, many investors wanted 
to purchase hotels and other real 
estate because of these reduced 
values. Since traditional capital 
sources were not available, and the 
previously used limited-partner- 
ship formats were not suitable for 
raising capital, REIm became the 
vehicle of choice for raising capital 
to make real estate purchases. In 
fact, many of the early hotel REITs 
got their start by buying hotels in 
this overbuilt environment at  50 
cents on the dollar. 
Three forms of RElTs exist 
There are typically three forms 
of REIT structures. In the tradi- 
tional structure, the REIT owns the 
real estate (hotels, apartments, and 
office buildings), and these are then 
leased to a lessee, who arranges 
management and franchise agree- 
ments. A paired-share REIT pairs a 
REIT with a C-Carp (public corpo- 
ration). This combined company is 
then traded as one. This integrated 
structure is advantageous to 
investors because the REIT leases 
the hotel properties to the C-Carp, 
which then is the operating 
company and the franchisor; this 
structure avoids what is termed in 
the industry "leakage," meaning 
loss of income due to the manage- 
ment contract and franchise agree- 
ment, which otherwise are typically 
given to another company. 
As a result of the IRS Restruc- 
turing Bill passed by the U. S. 
Congress in August 1998, paired 
share RElTs will not enjoy the tax 
advantages associated with their 
unique structure for future acquisi- 
tions. In anticipation of this 
announcement, Starwood Lodging, 
the largest lodging equity REIT, 
gave up its paired share status and 
converted to a tax paying C-Corp." 
The third type of REIT, similar 
to a paired-share REIT, is known as 
a paper-clip REP. The main differ- 
ence between the two is that paired- 
share REITs trade the shares in the 
REIT and the C-Carp as one inte- 
grated share, while a paper-clip 
REIT trades the shares in the RElT 
and the C-Corp separately; 
however, the REF and the C-Carp 
have common management control. 
From 1994 to 1998, RElTs domi- 
nated the lodging industry as 
owners of hotel properties and 
companies. The superior perfor- 
mance of their stock and the tax 
advantages enjoyed by their struc- 
ture attracted public capital to fuel 
their growth. Table 3 outlines the 
lodging REnk and their acquisi- 
tions in 1997. Paine Webber 
reported that REIT stocks were 
down by about 19 percent in the 
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first seven months of 1998." The 
direct impact of declining stock 
values for lodang REITS made it 
difficult for them to find financing 
to fuel their growth during this 
period. This trcnd continued until 
the end of 1999, in which year 
REITS provided a total return of 
-16.5 percent. 
However, REITS rebounded in 
2000 when total returns from 
January to September have been 
over 36 percent.'" While the total 
number of REITs is about the same, 
(as of the August 2000 there were 
16 hotel REITs)," the total inven- 
tory of rooms they control and 
overall market capitalization has 
considerably reduced since the 
thcir peak in 1997. As of September 
11, 2000, lodging REIT market 
capitalization was approximately 
$8 billion." 
In December 1999, the REIT 
Modernization A d  was signed into 
law. As REITs have evolved over the 
years into service-related real 
estate owners, the new a d  will 
allow them to create subsidiaries, 
which can provide value added 
services to their lessees, hitherto 
disallowed. Furthermore, the new 
act is expected to reduce some of the 
tax disadvantages of the present 
REIT structure.'%e new law goes 
into effect in 2001. 
Events impact capital 
In the past 30 years various 
interrelated critical events in the 
external environment impacted the 
availability of capital to the lodging 
industry. In the 1970s inadequate 
stock returns coupled with high 
inflation led to the creation of the 
Mortgage REIT. Monetary policies 
enacted in the early 1980s to 
combat Inflation led to interest rate 
increases, which in turn resulted in 
a competitive disadvantage for 
depository institutions. To rectify 
the situation, deregulation acts 
were passed which increased the 
scope of lending activities for 
savings and loan institutions. 
Lacking experience and proper 
Table 3 
Biggest RElT deals of 1997 
Acquirer Target Amount in $millions 
Stanvood Lodging . . . . . . . . .  I'IT Cop.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $17,000. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . .  Patriot American . . . . . . . . . .  Interstate Hotels. 2,100. 
Stanvood Lodging . . . . . . . . .  Westin Hotels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1,570. 
Patriot American . . . . . . . . . .  Wyndham Hotel Corp . . . . . . . . . .  1,100. 
Patriot American . . . . . . . . . .  Carnival Hotel and Resorts . . . . . .  ,485. 
Starwood Lodging . . . . . . . . .  HE1 Hotels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ,327. 
Patriot American . . . . . . . . . .  WHG Resorts & Casinos. . . . . . . . .  ,300. 
Patriot American . . . . . . . . . .  California Jockey Club . . . . . . . . . .  ,238. 
Patriot American . . . . . . . . . .  Grand Heritage Hotels . . . . . . . . . . .  .22. 
Source. Cwpers & Lybrand 
- 
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credit checks, unrestricted capital 
flowed to the lodging industry. In 
conjunction with capital avail- 
ability, favorable real estate taxa- 
tion laws provided further incentive 
to invest in hotel real estate. This 
potent mixture resulted in a hotel 
construction bubble, which burst at 
the end of the 1980s; the "needlen in 
this case was the removal of real 
estate taxincentives, passage of the 
Tax Reform Ad of 1986, and a 
general recession engulfing the 
nation. As a result the lodging 
industry was clearly overbuilt going 
into the 1990s. 
The 1990s were a time of 
tremendous change with regard to 
financing the lodging industry. In 
many ways changes in the past 
decade were a response to events of 
the 1980s. The decade began with a 
period of capital scarcity due to 
excesses of the 1980s. In response to 
this shortage, investment banks 
created financially-engineered 
products which included the 
various debt securities using mort- 
gage as a collateral. In addition, 
equity capital was available with 
the emergence of the REIT. 
Finance is redesigned 
In the 21st century, the interre- 
lated events and lessons learned in 
the past three decades have 
restructured capital sources and 
have redesigned lodging industry 
finance in many ways. 
Formerly, capital sources to the 
lodging industry were primarily 
private, now both public (issuance 
of debt and equity securities) and 
private (direct investment in hotel 
real estate or commercial mort- 
gage) sources of capital are avail- 
able to the industry. As the 
availability of public capital from 
both debt and equity slowed down 
in 1999, so did the room starts. It is 
interesting to note, however, that 
when the public capital markets 
started to decline in 1998, it 
presented opportunities to the 
traditional lenders (commercial 
banks and life insurance compa- 
nies) who stepped forward to fill the 
vacuum. This is an interesting 
change from financing earlier in the 
decade at which time traditional 
lenders stopped financing the 
lodging industry and public capital 
markets filled the vacuum. 
In this current financing envi- 
ronment, where capital is available 
from both public and private 
sources, the financing environment 
may be described as one of conserv- 
ative competition between the 
various sources of capital. This is 
reflected in the changes in the 
lending terms. While interest rates 
have declined h m  the mid-1990s, 
as compared to the 1980s, lenders 
are conservative in terms of their 
debt coverage ratio and loan to 
value ratios, which are more strin- 
gent as compared to the 1980s. 
With the introduction of securi- 
tization of debt and equity, hotel 
real estate investments do not cany 
the same amount of risk. Instead of 
investing in bricks and mortar, 
which are not liquid, investors have 
a more liquid investment with a 
better exit option. The ultimate 
impact of these creative instru- 
ments was to bring flexibility to real 
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estate investing, which makes 
investing in real estate appeal to a 
wider range of investors. 
With the introduction of securi- 
tization, a new organization-the 
rating agency- entered the hotel- 
financing arena in the 1990s. One 
of the main reasons for the over- 
building of the 1980s was a break- 
down in loan quality by the banks 
and thnfts. As each competed to 
make loans and earn up-front fees, 
their lending criteria began to be 
less strict, which resulted in poor- 
quality loans. The rating agencies 
are expected to prevent an excess 
flow of capital to the lodging 
industry as they evaluate a poten- 
tial issuer's credit quality (default 
risk) and assign a rating based on 
the issuer's business and market 
sector (hotel, regional mall, ware- 
house), management asset quality, 
and other financial mcasures such 
as profitability, size, and leverage.'" 
Therefore, it is expected that the 
securitization process and the role 
of the rating agencies will keep 
capital flows in check. 
Financing of the hotel industry 
changed From being merely mort- 
gage lending to what is called 
"credit-based financing." In this 
lending environment, loans are 
more akin to corporate loans, in 
which the borrower is treated as a 
business. "Credit-based financing 
takes into account not just the 
value, cash flow, and risk profile of 
a single property, but rather the 
borrower's overall credit, based on 
an evaluation of all the borrower's 
assets and operati~ns.'~" 
The profile of equity investors 
in the 1990s has changed from 
those in the 1980s. While limited 
partnerships and syndication were 
the dominant source of equity 
capital in the 1980s, the 1990s 
started with opportunity and acqui- 
sition funds buying depressed hotel 
real estate; from the mid-to-late 
1990s, hotel companies and REITs 
hecame the major source of equity 
capital. Today there are 29 public 
hotel companies (C-Corps) and 15 
equity RETTs that raise capital 
through the issuance of equity and 
debt. While this activity slowed 
down in 1999, it still remains at 
much higher levels than in the 
1970s and 1980s. 
As the financial services 
industry continues to consolidate 
and the last vestiges of the Glass- 
Steagall act of 1933 continue to be 
dismantled, the financial services 
industry will have more flexibility 
in their decision to lend and invest 
in the lodging industry. This is 
expected to positivcly impact 
capital flow to the lodging industry. 
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